The Balkans: A Time for Principled Action

May 2001 -- Last September, then-candidate George W. Bush promised "an orderly and timely withdrawal" of American ground forces from the Balkans. By contrast, defenders of the Clinton Balkan policy maintain that the United States must keep forces on the ground to demonstrate leadership. The administration's choice thus takes on a more-than-ordinary significance because the decision will constitute either an implicit criticism or an implicit endorsement of the way the Clinton administration conducted foreign policy.

On both strategic and symbolic grounds, President Bush should bring the troops home. Strategically, their presence is not warranted. Symbolically, the Bush administration needs to signal a dramatic change in America's way of doing business in the world: a return to principled action in foreign policy and to the national interest as the overriding principle.

Focusing Our Mission

A turn to principle seems likely to come about simply as a matter of presidential character. Throughout the campaign, George Bush was ridiculed for not answering questions with concrete policy solutions of his own. He tried to explain that he would lay down certain basic principles for his administration and then make sure that his subordinates implemented them. At the time, the media mocked this approach as nothing more than a dodge to hide his ignorance.

Lately, however, some analysts are coming to understand that Bush's approach is a legitimate operating style for an executive. On March 11, the lead story in the New York Times was headlined: "Bush is providing corporate model for White House." The reporter, Richard L. Berke, wrote that "Several longtime government observers said they expected members of the cabinet to have far more latitude than those under Mr. Clinton." But he then added, almost in bewilderment, "Still, it also appears that the White House is in firm control of the cabinet." What Berke apparently cannot grasp is the nature of leadership by principles. For a pragmatic executive like Clinton, getting the result you want means getting the concrete policy solutions you want. For a principled executive like Bush, getting the result you want means getting your principle implemented. Exactly how it is implemented can be safely left to others.

Of course, if the president's principle is a faulty one, then the implementation is going to be faulty. But here, too, there is reason for hope. During the second presidential debate, George W. Bush stated his overriding foreign-policy standard as follows: "The first question is: What's in the best interests of the United States? What's in the best interests of our people? When it comes to foreign policy, that'll be my guiding question: Is it in our nation's interests?"

Again, this stands in contrast to the previous administration's approach. Given Clinton's fundamental aversion to thinking in principle, it was perhaps inevitable that his administration's foreign policy would be ad hoc. This is not to say that the administration's adventures in international relations were lacking excuses. They weren't. But the excuses kept changing, as the case of the Balkans illustrates. For most of Clinton's first term, the United States maintained a hands-off policy in the region, a critical failure of leadership that exacerbated the three-way civil war in Bosnia and made necessary the bombing campaigns of 1995 in Bosnia and 1999 in Serbia. Then, various reasons were offered for our military interventions: growing refugee crises; rumors of genocide; and the need to prevent escalation of the conflict to other parts of Europe.

Those are reasons for action. But are they good reasons? And how is one to decide?

Under a pragmatic foreign policy, there is no way of deciding. But the matter is easily decided when one applies the Bush standard: How relevant were these factors to U.S. interests? The refugee problems mainly affected European states such as Italy, Germany, and the states surrounding Yugoslavia, and in fact were caused by the failure to take early action. The existence of a systematic attempt at genocide, an abused term in the Clinton era (especially when government officials were banned from using it during the mass killings in Rwanda in 1994), has yet to be demonstrated. The escalation argument seems to hinge on the fact that the catalytic events of the First World War took place in the Balkans. Given that the strategic setting in Europe bears no relation whatsoever to the situation 90 years ago, this is the equivalent of saying that peacekeepers should quickly be dispatched to Charleston Harbor because that is where the U.S. Civil War started.

Defenders of the Clinton policy also claim that the 1999 war helped bring down Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevich, a good example of the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. Perhaps he would have lost power sooner had we not intervened. In any case, that goal has been achieved—but during the conflict the Clinton administration denied this was an objective.

So what should now be U.S. policy in the Balkans, and, specifically, is there any reason for keeping 11,000 troops there? What does the Bush standard tell us today?

Senator Joseph Biden (Democrat-Delaware) recently wrote: "Precisely because the Balkans are central to Europe's security, they are central to our security." It is difficult to take this argument seriously. A few years ago in this country only experts in European security matters had heard of Kosovo—yet now it is central to our security? If that were true, then the president's principle could certainly justify the current military presence—indeed, a commitment of any scale. But that is clearly ludicrous.

A rigorous and realistic analysis of the Balkan issue shows that region is at best of secondary and indirect security interest to the United States. We have no significant trade or resource interests. We have little geostrategic interest—where we do, friendly countries control the important ports, airfields, and choke points. Our only appreciable interest—correctly identified by Senator Biden but exaggerated—is to show tangible support for our NATO allies in maintaining stability on their borders. Given this end, how should we go about achieving it? To answer that question, the Bush administration will have to repair a foreign-policy apparatus badly frayed in the Clinton years.

Honing the Tools

Opponents of the Bush administration approach to the Balkans cast the policy as isolationist. That is an unfair characterization, the result of equating foreign involvement with military intervention. That, in turn, is a product of the inept, often spasmodic handling of the military instrument of national power by the Clinton administration. Typical of the cavalier approach of the Clintonites was Secretary of State Madeline Albright's comment to Colin Powell: "What's the point of having this superb military you're always talking about if we can't use it?" Using military arms to make up for failures in diplomacy has imposed significant long-term costs on the military.

For example, the Balkans costs the Pentagon $3 billion per year (invariably described as "just over one percent of the defense budget" by supporters of continued expenditure). But beyond the dollar costs, readiness has been impaired. The Third Infantry Division, with one brigade deployed in Bosnia, was recently downgraded to the second-lowest combat readiness status, and in 1999 the Tenth Mountain Division and First Infantry Divisions were both briefly downgraded to "not combat ready" status as a result of duty in the Balkans. The logistics support capacity of the Twenty-first U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) is strained to the point where it is doubtful the United States could respond to a crisis in the Middle East where real, direct, and vital national interests are involved. In addition, the forces deployed to the Balkans rely heavily on specialized units in the National Guard and Reserve, which makes them unavailable for other contingencies, and places unfair burdens on the troops and their families.

The choice faced by the Bush administration is not either abandoning the Balkans or maintaining the status quo. The Balkan region has some importance to the United States, and total disengagement would be a mistake. But engagement need not be the responsibility of the Defense Department. Rather than trying to make the military instrument fit the mission, as the Clinton administration was wont to do, the U.S. should use the best tools available for the job. The United States can remain engaged diplomatically through the State Department, through non-governmental humanitarian organizations such as the Red Cross, through the United Nations, and other agencies including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. This is true now in the Balkans and will be true elsewhere in the future. Let the State Department handle diplomacy, with agencies such as the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance overseeing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. Keep the military in reserve and ready to be used at those times and places when it can focus on what it does best—promote peace through deterrence when possible; fight and win wars when necessary.

The president has a chance to show strong leadership in Europe by relying on the principle of national interest to set priorities, determine objectives, and take the necessary steps to achieve them. The time is ripe for principled action in the Balkans. The warfighters have done their job, and done it well. Let's declare victory and bring them home.

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